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PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU
INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
Confidential Taped Statement
Sergeant Craig Morgan DPSST #38845

Interview Date: 03/30/2010
IAD #: 2010-B-0004
Complainant: Portland Police Bureau

Interviewed: Sergeant Liani Reyna DPSST #28925

MORGAN: This is Sergeant CRAIG MORGAN. It is March 30, 2010. It is 1650 in the afternoon. We're located in an IAD interview room on the 12th floor of the Justice Center. Present with me is my IAD partner Investigator BARRY RENNA, Sergeant LIANI REYNA and her PPA representative Officer DAVE DOBLER. We're here in reference to IAD Case #2010-B-0004. The associated PPD case number is 10-8325. Sergeant REYNA has been advised that her conduct and/or the conduct of any other bureau member present on January 29, 2010 at 12800 NE Sandy Boulevard is the subject of this investigation. Sergeant REYNA has reviewed information necessary to be reasonably apprised of the nature of the allegations of the complaint. Sergeant REYNA has been informed that she is a witness in the case, and that Captain ED BRUMFIELD is in charge of the investigation. I have advised Sergeant REYNA that she could have representation present during the interview and Officer DOBLER is here in that capacity. Sergeant REYNA has been provided a copy of the Advanced Notice and Waiver Form and has signed it. Sergeant REYNA, under the authority of Captain BRUMFIELD, I am ordering you to answer all of my questions fully and truthfully. If you fail to respond fully and truthfully, you may be disciplined up to and including dismissal. Do you understand?

REYNA: Yes.

MORGAN: Okay. And just so we have it on our tape, just to clarify, um, we were discussing the terminology of witness versus suspect officer on this, and since it's an internal review of a shooting, we did make a hand-written note on the waiver form that indicates that you're an involved officer for lack of a better term regarding this case.

REYNA: Okay. And in line with that I'll just raise an objection for the record on Article 61.1.1 regarding informed of the nature of the investigation whether the officer is a witness or a suspect to comply with that, so that's an objection.

REYNA: Okay. Yep, same, same kind of area there so...Okay. Let's go ahead and get started then. Um, we'll just start with kind of the basic background and then move into the call here. Um, how long have you been employed by the Portland Police Bureau?

REYNA: Sixteen years.

MORGAN: Okay. And how long as a Sergeant?

REYNA: Four and a half.

MORGAN: Okay. And any prior law enforcement experience before Portland?

REYNA: No.

MORGAN: Okay. And you don't have to give me the whole recap, but just kind of where have you been assigned since you've been employed at the police bureau?

REYNA: After going through the training rotation through the then three precincts, I worked at Northeast Precinct for I think five years.

MORGAN: Okay.

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49 **REYNA:** During my tenure at North Precinct I was detached to SERT and I spent two years on the
50 SERT team and transferred to Southeast Precinct while on the SERT team. I spent about four months
51 in the Telephone Report Unit, and then I went to North Precinct in St. John's in 2001.
52 **MORGAN:** Okay. And then since you were promoted, where have you been assigned as a sergeant?
53 **REYNA:** North, well the two north precincts.
54 **MORGAN:** Okay. And what is your current assignment?
55 **REYNA:** North Precinct.
56 **MORGAN:** Okay. And afternoon shift?
57 **REYNA:** Yes.
58 **MORGAN:** Okay. And what was your assignment on January 29th of 2010 this year?
59 **REYNA:** I was working North Precinct.
60 **MORGAN:** Okay. And pretty early on in your shift there you became aware of an incident that was
61 going on at 12800 NE Sandy Boulevard. Tell me how you came to be aware of that call.
62 **REYNA:** While I was logging on to my car getting my equipment ready in the parking lot, I heard an
63 officer come on the air and say can we have a supervisor.
64 **MORGAN:** Okay. And you answered up at that point?
65 **REYNA:** Yes.
66 **MORGAN:** Okay. And what did you know about the call that you were responding to?
67 **REYNA:** Well, I didn't hear it come out because I was doing some other stuff in the precinct, and I
68 was on Tac 2, so I missed the initial dispatch. So, when I answered up, I asked for the nature of the
69 call.
70 **MORGAN:** Okay.
71 **REYNA:** And dispatch gave me a quick rundown, and then as I got it, I pulled it up and I read it.
72 **MORGAN:** Okay. And do you remember what you gathered from that initial read-through of the
73 call?
74 **REYNA:** Um, what was initially put in the CAD printout, which said that we were doing a welfare
75 check on ANGIE JONES with her three kids, she had a suicidal boyfriend who tried to kill himself.
76 Um, they weren't hearing from ANGIE, and they were concerned because the guy was armed with a
77 gun and he had lost a family member and he was distraught. They included the guy's PPDS record in
78 the call, and I was able to glance through the charges and I saw Attempted Murder, handgun. So there
79 was all that going into it.
80 **MORGAN:** What did that charge indicate to you at that time?
81 **REYNA:** Um, this is a potentially violent person, the highest threat level that you can consider.
82 **MORGAN:** Okay. And you were, um...North has a pre-relief and a regular relief at this point? Is
83 that right?
84 **REYNA:** Yes.
85 **MORGAN:** You were the late relief, I guess, on that day. Is that right?
86 **REYNA:** Yes.
87 **MORGAN:** Okay. Do you know if the call had been going on for a little bit, what the pre-relief
88 sergeant, why they hadn't responded at all to the call?
89 **REYNA:** Um, Sergeant ELLERTSON was the pre-relief sergeant. She was in the office at the time.
90 And WHEELWRIGHT was the other late relief sergeant. I don't know what JAN was doing. I
91 couldn't tell you.

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92 **MORGAN:** Okay. And so officer asks for a sergeant, you say, I'm on the way. You read through the
93 call, you head there. And then just kind of tell me what happens from there.

94 **REYNA:** So, I'm listening to it. I'm monitoring it as things are going on. I can tell that they've
95 already got people there set up on it, and they're trying to do a telephone ping. And the officer is
96 asking Dispatch, can you ping the telephone so we can try to find out if she's even there. And there
97 was a lot of problems with the company, the telephone company, because Dispatch was saying, I don't
98 know if they can do it. But then there was some broadcast about like a location or something like that.

99 **MORGAN:** Okay.

100 **REYNA:** And so, basically, I'm listening to the officers who are running it and they're working it, and
101 I'm just trying to get there.

102 **MORGAN:** Okay. And when you arrive on scene, what do you do when you first get there?

103 **REYNA:** When I first arrived, I asked them where to meet them, tell them I'm coming into the area.
104 They tell me to come straight into the front of the complex, I'll see the cars. So I see the patrol cars out
105 there. And BOYLAN was talking to a man. And LEWTON came up to me, and I'm like, you know,
106 what's going on? So they're trying to give me the story, and I can't remember exactly specifically that
107 interaction.

108 **MORGAN:** Okay. Do you know who the man was that BOYLAN was talking to? Or did you figure
109 it out?

110 **REYNA:** Well, I know now that it was her dad.

111 **MORGAN:** Okay. You don't remember if he...did you know that at the time that that's who it was?

112 **REYNA:** I can't remember if I knew that at the time.

113 **MORGAN:** Okay. Were you privy to their conversation, or were they a little ways away from where
114 you and LEWTON were?

115 **REYNA:** Initially they were a ways away.

116 **MORGAN:** Okay.

117 **REYNA:** And that's why I turned to LEWTON because LEWTON was the free guy running around.
118 So I naturally went to him to see if he could help me out with it.

119 **MORGAN:** Okay. And anyone besides LEWTON, BOYLAN, and QUACKENBUSH on scene when
120 you arrive, or was it just those three and yourself?

121 **REYNA:** I think BOCCHINO and GRYPHON were already on the back.

122 **MORGAN:** Okay. And you said you don't remember specifically what LEWTON told you? Did he
123 have any information, new information that wasn't in the call on the CAD?

124 **REYNA:** Not that I remember.

125 **MORGAN:** Okay.

126 **REYNA:** Because we were going to need to get it from BOYLAN, he was talking to the guy.

127 **MORGAN:** Okay. And so after LEWTON kind of gives you the quick lowdown, what happens next?

128 **REYNA:** Well, I'm trying to think of okay, what are we going to do? This is a welfare check. I mean,
129 we don't know what's going on. And we don't know that anything bad has happened because the only
130 reason we're there is the family couldn't get in contact with the woman. And you can't...you could
131 assume the worst, you could assume the least, so, really, we're just there right now collecting
132 information. And so that's what we were going to need to get from the dad, and then BOYLAN is
133 coming over to start talking, and I hear him say, oh, there she is. And here comes the woman walking
134 out from the center of the apartment complex.

135 **MORGAN:** Okay.

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136 **REYNA:** So it's like, oh, well good, you know, she's alive. She's safe. That was a really good thing.
137 **MORGAN:** Okay. How long after you got there would you say that...?
138 **REYNA:** Really soon. Relatively soon.
139 **MORGAN:** Okay. And so then, did you ever get from BOYLAN what ANGIE's dad had told him?
140 **REYNA:** Sitting right here right now I can't remember because of how everything kind of expanded.
141 Um, you know, my concern was, you know, this guy's upset because he lost his brother and people get
142 really emotional. We don't know what they're going to do. The initial call had this...he threatened to
143 kill himself, but we didn't know from the call what he tried to do. And my concern now is for her
144 safety, for the safety of the three children, and his safety. You know, maybe he needs some mental
145 health assistance, and we're gonna need to provide that. So, um, you know, since I've thought a lot
146 about this, sitting here right now I can't tell you.
147 **MORGAN:** Okay. And you kind of covered this a little bit, but just to be specific, when you
148 were...when you first dispatched to the call and you're on the way, what is in your head about what
149 kind of call this is?
150 **REYNA:** To me this is a routine call. We...even after this incident, we are getting a lot, a lot of calls
151 of suicide, and I noticed, typically around December and the holidays, you get a spike in suicidal calls,
152 but with the recession, it has been exponential and we go constantly to suicidal calls, and, um, you
153 know, it's something we go and we either leave the person alone, or they're willing to go to the
154 hospital with us. So, at this point, it's still a routine call. We need to go find out if it's legit, what's
155 going on, and collect the information. But, also, I'm completely aware of the safety issues too, because
156 of the nature of it. But we do get a lot of, so-and-so called the hot line, has a gun, or whatever type-
157 thing like that. And I knew from previous experience that North Precinct had responded somewhere in
158 St. John's to a guy who was drunk, in a basement, and had actually cranked off rounds with a gun.
159 And they went and they surrounded the place, but he was alone, and he wouldn't come out, so they
160 walked away. So, I already knew that going into this call as well.
161 **MORGAN:** Okay. How long before this one had that one been? Do you know?
162 **REYNA:** Within a year.
163 **MORGAN:** Okay. Um, so you're primarily thinking suicidal subject. Did you feel this might be a
164 barricaded suspect situation?
165 **REYNA:** No.
166 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you feel this might be a hostage situation?
167 **REYNA:** No.
168 **MORGAN:** Okay. And if you can, just kind of explain why you didn't feel those situations were met.
169 **REYNA:** There was no indication from the CAD call. I mean, this is simply...the guy was upset and
170 the family had not been able to make contact with her. I mean, you're making a huge assumption here.
171 I can't make that assumption based on this CAD call.
172 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you consider calling SERT and HNT when you first received the call?
173 **REYNA:** No.
174 **MORGAN:** Okay. And the same reason we just went over?
175 **REYNA:** Because that's like pulling the trigger before you even see the target. You don't know what
176 you have. You're...you need to go assess it and make an intelligent decision.
177 **MORGAN:** Okay.
178 **REYNA:** And I'm very well aware of policy 720.00 and the requirements for SERT. They did not
179 apply here at this time.

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180 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you consider calling for a SERT for a phone consultation or anything at
181 this point?

182 **REYNA:** No.

183 **MORGAN:** Same reason?

184 **REYNA:** I have prior SERT training, and I have also spoken with Commander JAMES FERRARIS
185 about Critical Incident Management. And he's also given us as sergeants two, at least two training
186 lessons on Critical Incident Management; so I kind of know the template, and the first thing you need
187 to do is you need to get there and assess it.

188 **MORGAN:** Okay. And then, kind of a little out of place to ask this, but we'll just get it out of the
189 way here, do you feel like your past history with SERT as has been documented in the local
190 newspapers and that sort of stuff, do you feel like that in any way affected your decision making on this
191 call as far as whether or not to use them?

192 **REYNA:** Absolutely not. I won't hesitate to call out SERT when I need them. And I also trust when I
193 call them, they'll come and they'll help.

194 **MORGAN:** Right. Okay. So now, just going back to the call here, then. So, um, ANGIE JONES
195 comes out and who is it that ends up kind of contacting her and starting to gather information from her.

196 **REYNA:** Um, BOYLAN and I were standing together with her, and one thing I noted was she had this
197 wide-eyed look. You know, just kind of like a...like more than a surprised, kind of like a scared why-
198 are-you-here look on her face. And he was explaining to her why we were there, because we were
99 supposed to check on her. And she said that she wasn't answering the phone because they had just
200 woken up, the family was sleeping, which, yeah, that's possible, you know. And she was telling us
201 about that she had three kids in there, 2, 4 and 5, I think. And, um, she was really worried about us
202 being there. She thought our presence was going to escalate him.

203 **MORGAN:** Okay. And so, as far as...she then told you basically the three kids are still inside, um,
204 and Mr. CAMPBELL is still inside with them.

205 **REYNA:** Yes.

206 **MORGAN:** That's the information you get? Is it your impression they're all still sleeping, or is
207 everyone awake at this point, or did you get that?

208 **REYNA:** It was my impression they were in the process of waking up still.

209 **MORGAN:** Okay.

210 **REYNA:** Because she said the kids weren't dressed. So, I don't know if they were in pajamas, but,
211 you know, it's like why don't you bring the kids out. Because they're not dressed.

212 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you hear Ms. JONES tell Officer BOYLAN that, um, the suicidal
213 behavior that Mr. CAMPBELL had exhibited had all been occurring the day before, and that today -
214 the day in question, the day you guys were at the call - that he's actually doing much better.

215 **REYNA:** No.

216 **MORGAN:** Okay. Would you have been in a position to hear their entire conversation, or is it
217 possible that she said that to him at a point when you weren't right there?

218 **REYNA:** I...I mean if she said it, I don't know what I was doing. I mean, I didn't hear that.

219 **MORGAN:** Okay.

220 **REYNA:** That's all I can tell you. I didn't hear it.

221 **MORGAN:** And as far as you know, that information was never broadcast to the rest of the officers
222 on the call or conveyed to them in some way?

223 **REYNA:** Not to my knowledge.

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224 **MORGAN:** Okay.

225 **REYNA:** And just so I understand, can you clarify that statement that was made?

226 **MORGAN:** Yeah. Um, Ms. JONES telling Officer BOYLAN basically, and of course I'm
227 paraphrasing here, um, all of the suicidal behavior that CAMPBELL was showing had been the day
228 before, had been the night before, and he's actually doing much better today.

229 **REYNA:** Oh, okay.

230 **MORGAN:** Is that...does that...your answers are not going to change based on that clarification at
231 all?

232 **REYNA:** No. It doesn't change my answer. I just wanted to make sure I understood totally what you
233 are saying.

234 **MORGAN:** No, but I just wanted to make sure I didn't assume your answer would stay the same. So,
235 good enough. Okay, at this point, have you notified the Lieutenant or the Captain at all?

236 **REYNA:** No.

237 **MORGAN:** Okay.

238 **REYNA:** Um, but to add to maybe something that she did provide that I did hear from my detective
239 interview...um, sometime after, we were talking about going inside, and maybe I'm jumping ahead
240 here, I did...I did note that she said that she was really worried that he didn't know we were there
241 because for now the situation was calm. I don't know if that's...

242 **MORGAN:** Kind of...yeah, along the same vein anyway.

243 **REYNA:** It could be different or not.

244 **MORGAN:** Okay. So, I think we'll kind of transition to that part of this now. So, you get the
245 information about where everyone is and what's going on, and what happens next? What's going on at
246 this point?

247 **REYNA:** So as far as I know, the only people that are inside this apartment are the three children and
248 him. And my concern is because of his behavior the night before, because of the family's concerns,
249 that they're worried enough about his state of mind that they called us. I mean, they're calling us
250 because they're worried that he harmed her, that we need to check on him. And we really need to have
251 a conversation with him about where he's at emotionally and mentally and is he going to be okay to
252 leave there with the family. I didn't want to say, okay, ANGIE, you're fine. Bye. And then he does
253 one of the homicidal/familiacidal things, and we could have been at a point to intervene in that. So, it
254 was really important to have contact with him, but my concern also was, she said he would escalate if
255 he knew we were there, so what's he going to do with the three children now. And that posed a, you
256 know...it posed a strategic question, a tactical question, okay, what do we do and how are we going to
257 safely contact this man without escalating him as she says. Because as far as we were at that point, he
258 didn't know we were there. And I don't even know why she came out. And I don't know if dad put a
259 phone call into her. I still don't know why she came out. How she knew we were there.

260 **MORGAN:** Okay.

261 **REYNA:** So I started talking with LEWTON and BOYLAN about how we wanted to handle this.
262 Um, if he's sleeping, that's actually good. That's to our advantage. If we can go in there while he's
263 asleep, we can get hands on him, have that conversation, and everything's safe. Um, so I started asking
264 about the layout of the apartment, I wanted to know where things were, you know, the living room, the
265 kitchen, where is he specifically. And she said that there was kind of...you walk into a hallway, and I
266 think she said the kitchen was on the right. He was supposed to be asleep on the couch. And I was
267 asking, well, can you get to him? And she said something about the children being between the door
268 and him. And I didn't...you know, I was trying to clarify, and it was hard getting information from

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269 her, but for me tactically, that's why I'm trying to think of how fast can you sneak in there and get the
270 hands on him. And so she said, well, the children are there and they might pose a problem in terms of,
271 you know, trying to get to him. So, I included LEWTON in, and was bouncing ideas off the officers,
272 like if he doesn't have access to a gun, do you feel comfortable going in, and we'll just grab him? And
273 they're like, yeah, yeah, that sounds like a good idea. So, I said, well, let's hammer down where this
274 gun is. Where does he keep the gun? So, BOYLAN and I were talking to her about the gun. You
275 know, I'm like, is it in a closet? Does he keep it under the bed? Things of that nature, and she said, he
276 last had it in a sock in his jacket and he's wearing that jacket right now on the couch. That just negated
277 any idea of going in. We couldn't do that. So, I knew at that point, we were going to have to put a
278 phone call in to him and ask him to come out.

279 **MORGAN:** Okay. And there is mention in the CAD call and over the radio about setting up for a
280 loud hail. Was an actual, traditional loud hail over the car speaker ever really a consideration? Or how
281 did that come into play?

282 **REYNA:** Well, I set up for that in anticipation that he didn't answer the telephone. So what I was
283 doing is I'm thinking, steps ahead, kind of like in a chess game. I wanted to be five steps ahead of any
284 action so if this doesn't happen, then I can go to that. If that doesn't happen, I can go to my third
285 alternate. So, the idea was in all these situations, as Jim FERRARIS has trained me, as the Portland
286 Police Bureau has trained me, first contain the scene. Contain the situation. RYAN LEWTON was
287 working with perimeter, setting the perimeter up. Um, we didn't know what to expect from the guy, so
288 we had to be safe. And he wanted long guns to cover side one and side three, and I thought that was a
289 really smart idea. I said go ahead, order them up. Um, I put a car in there so that if he came out, we
290 didn't know if he was going to come out with a gun. We knew he wanted suicide by cop because that
291 was in the call. And a suicide by cop is an extremely unusual circumstance. It's not just someone
292 wanting to kill themselves; they want us to kill them. And the problem is, we need to talk to the guy,
293 which puts us face to face with him. I mean, ideally, the way to prevent suicide by cop is you take the
294 police out of the equation. They can't accomplish the mission. But we still need to check on him. So
295 we're in a conundrum. So, we had to be prudent and set up a tactical plan, which is why I put the car
296 there, so we could have hard cover. We call him out on the telephone and we could ideally take him
297 into custody, get him mental help. And so when I said loud hail, it was like the farthest future
298 event...if he doesn't answer the telephone, then we're going to go to the speaker on the car and say,
299 hey, AARON, can you come out.

300 **MORGAN:** Okay. All right. And, kind of going in to the setting up the car and where everyone
301 ended up, had you worked with most of these officers, or, I guess all these officers enough to feel like
302 you knew their strengths and weaknesses and where they'd best be deployed?

303 **REYNA:** Um, yes and no. Like, I knew QUACKENBUSH would be a really good communicator.
304 And when I was putting my people together, and, as I said, I included the officers in the decision
305 making and the planning, I said, we're going to need a communicator. I think QUACKENBUSH
306 would be really good. What do you think? And they're like, yeah. I nominate QUACKENBUSH. So,
307 he had everybody's confidence, so I was very comfortable with that. LEWTON was showing really
308 good judgment with his ability to set the perimeter, and all the other guys at this point, you know, since
309 being at the new North they've shown to be competent. So, I felt really good.

10 **MORGAN:** Okay. And just talk a little bit more about QUACKENBUSH as communicator and why
311 you chose him to be the contact person.

312 **REYNA:** From reading his reports. You can learn a lot about a police officer by reading their reports.
313 He's extremely articulate.

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314 **MORGAN:** Okay. And you said LEWTON was assisting with establishing the perimeter. Um, was
315 that a conscious, I guess, handing off of one of the assignments to him so you could divert your
316 attention, or divert is probably not a fair word, but use your attention elsewhere?

317 **REYNA:** It seemed like everyone just worked really well together and they knew what needed to be
318 done. They just worked to get it done. Like, I didn't have to say, you, you, you, all the time. They
319 were just like, okay, I'm doing this, I'm doing this. Okay, that sounds like a great idea. Okay, thank
320 you. And they were keeping me informed too, so I knew what they were doing.

321 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you end up picking which officers ended up as the custody team at the
322 patrol car?

323 **REYNA:** I did.

324 **MORGAN:** Okay. And any particular reasons for any of those officers having the roles they were
325 given?

326 **REYNA:** Yes. LEWTON was less lethal certified, so I told him to get his bean bag gun. Initially
327 KEMPLE had his shotgun out, and I needed two people to be a handcuff team, so BOYLAN was going
328 to be on handcuffing. And we were already ordering an AR and had a less lethal, and I know that you
329 can't have too many long guns or you're limited. So I told, specifically told KEMPLE to go put the
330 shotgun away and said you're going to be hands on. Because we need people to do these a certain way.

331 **MORGAN:** Okay. And had you told LEWTON to go ahead and get his, retrieve his bean bag gun and
332 serve in that capacity?

33 **REYNA:** Oh, yeah.

334 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you give the custody team members specific instructions as to use of
335 force?

336 **REYNA:** Not at that point in time.

337 **MORGAN:** Okay. Any specific rules of engagement discussed or anything like that at that point?

338 **REYNA:** Standard rules were applying. That's all we operate under in patrol, standard rules of
339 engagement.

340 **MORGAN:** Okay. And who was in charge of the custody team?

341 **REYNA:** I was.

342 **MORGAN:** And you said, I think, LEWTON initially had the idea to call for a couple of long guns.
343 I'm assuming by that you're referring to the AR15.

344 **REYNA:** Yes.

345 **MORGAN:** Um, you concurred with that decision obviously?

346 **REYNA:** Yes, I did.

347 **MORGAN:** Um, if he hadn't brought it up first, would that have been something you probably would
348 have been asking for?

349 **REYNA:** Yes, eventually, yes.

350 **MORGAN:** Okay. And just talk a little bit about why an AR15 was a good tactical weapon to have
351 on this call.

352 **REYNA:** Um, there's a couple of reasons. First of all, distance. AR15 gives you more accuracy at a
353 greater distance. You can be farther away and be safe. Um, it's a more accurate weapon than our
354 handgun. Also, ballistically, I know that the rounds that we use in our AR15 are frangible when they
355 impact an object, and they're more likely to break up, whereas a 9 mm will penetrate and you'll get
356 over-penetration so if you miss your target, you run the chance of that round going through an
357 apartment, through people, and even though some of the... I think we still have the hollow tips, a

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358 different mechanism, if it's filled with gunk, it becomes a ball ammo and it will go even farther. So it
359 really was a good choice of weapon.

360 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you actually have your...you're an AR15 operator?

361 **REYNA:** Yes, I am.

362 **MORGAN:** Did you actually have your AR15 out at one point in the call?

363 **REYNA:** Yes, initially.

364 **MORGAN:** Tell me about that.

365 **REYNA:** Yes. Um, the location itself was on the outer, outer east end of our precinct. And even
366 though we had two ARs coming, we already had one there, um, in order to get the ball rolling and try to
367 make the contact, I chose to initially deploy with the AR15 with the custody team and because I'm
368 comfortable in managing that, I have a lot of...lot of additional training with weapons, not just because
369 of SERT, but because I've taken personal time to go to pistol schools, rifle schools, I do shooting
370 competitions, so I'm able to talk and think and move with a weapon, which is not usual for most police
371 officers. We don't train like that. So I can coordinate while still having it. And my idea was if
372 QUACKENBUSH can make contact and the guy comes out, then we'll be able to resolve things. But
373 if he didn't, I knew I had someone coming and I could dial myself out of that, and that's what
374 happened.

375 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you know Officer FRASHOUR?

376 **REYNA:** Um, peripherally.

377 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you feel comfortable with him as an AR15 operator on the call?

378 **REYNA:** I did.

379 **MORGAN:** Okay. And then, um, I think it was LEWTON again over the air, who requested a canine.
380 Was that, again, his idea, or was that something you told him to get on the air and ask for one, or how
381 did that come about?

382 **REYNA:** No, we needed a canine there, and I don't know if it was...I hadn't said it, but he said it.
383 Like I said, he was working seamlessly. And helping me, so...

384 **MORGAN:** Okay.

385 **REYNA:** We definitely needed one.

386 **MORGAN:** And just explain again, we're kind of going over some basic stuff, but just explain the
387 advantages of having a canine on a call like this.

388 **REYNA:** The advantages is for containment and preventing a break out. If Mr. CAMPBELL had
389 come out and decided he didn't want to talk to us, and he was going to boogie into the neighborhood,
390 you have a canine there. And, you know, he could have been armed with a weapon, come out with a
391 weapon and run into the neighborhood. Now you've got some guy running through trying to break
392 your perimeter. You could let the dog go and catch him, hopefully. Um, also, you could use the dog
393 for less lethal force if necessary. And since we were dealing with a guy who had threatened to kill
394 himself the night before, was suicidal, wanted the police to kill him, he was potentially armed, we
395 knew he had a gun in there, it's supposed to be in his coat, you could use a dog as a force continuum to
396 take him down. And I knew that.

397 **MORGAN:** Okay. And any other tactical decisions you kind of made there at the initial setup. We
398 talked about having an AR and a less lethal, getting the canine there, establishing a perimeter.
399 Anything else that you remember that you took care of when you first got there?

400 **REYNA:** Um, I had someone assigned to ANGIE. That was BURNS, so we needed to keep a
401 constant communication with her.

402 **MORGAN:** Okay. And then at one point I think earlier you asked for a reaction car.

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403 **REYNA:** I did.

404 **MORGAN:** Can you tell me about that? What your thought was there?

405 **REYNA:** That is again for break-out. I've learned with, um, when you set up perimeters, you've got

406 people on fixed posts, who you don't necessarily want to move to chase someone because people

407 double back all the time. So if you have a reactionary car you can send them to where the person's

408 fleeing, and they can also jump the perimeter, so if you need to shift your perimeter really quickly, you

409 send the reactionary car to the opposite corner.

410 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you consider doing evacuations of the surrounding apartments at all?

411 **REYNA:** I had not because I was told that the apartments near him were empty.

412 **MORGAN:** As in vacant?

413 **REYNA:** Vacant. Because the information came from the manager.

414 **MORGAN:** Okay. If those had been occupied, would that have been something you would have

415 considered?

416 **REYNA:** Yes.

417 **MORGAN:** Okay.

418 **REYNA:** And also, the situation hadn't escalated to a hostage situation or anything like that, as well.

419 I mean, we weren't there.

420 **MORGAN:** Right. Okay, and so now you've got your resources in place, you're set up, and

421 QUACKENBUSH is going to attempt to make contact. Just kind of walk me through what happens

422 next from there.

423 **REYNA:** So, we're in position, make the call. He says he hung up. Drats. So he says he hung up.

424 And then, the information comes out, I think it was from BOYLAN, that now he knows we're there.

425 He found out we're there, and he said something like, I ain't playing. Don't make me get my gun, or

426 something like that. It's like, oh great, now we've got that. So, um, FRASHOUR arrives. I tell him

427 what we've got, what we're doing there. I leave the custody team, I go to the alcove and I meet with

428 BOYLAN and QUACKENBUSH, and I think that's when BIRKINBINE arrived. And so we start

429 talking about, okay, he knows we're here, he hung up the phone, um, we're going to need to try to put

430 another call in. We need to make contact with him, and how are we going to safely separate him from

431 these children so we can talk to him and have a conversation? And we're talking about that, and, I

432 think this is where, I'm a little fuzzy, I can't remember if ELIAS is there. I think during the alcove

433 conversation we're gathering information and the kids come out.

434 **MORGAN:** Okay.

435 **REYNA:** And let me try to back up. When BIRKINBINE got there, he asked if I needed anything. I

436 said, no, I've got it. We're working on this. I said we need to make contact, so we can get the children

437 out. And he pulled QUACKENBUSH into the alcove deeper. And they went into a corner of the

438 alcove while I was with BOYLAN.

439 **MORGAN:** Okay.

440 **REYNA:** And we're talking about, okay, what do we need to do to get these children out?

441 **MORGAN:** Okay. Let me just stop you there and we'll kind of go through a few of the specifics of

442 this part of the call here. Um, so QUACKENBUSH says he hung up. Did you get any impression, had

443 there been any conversation at all, or was it, hi, it's the police, click? Or did you get a sense?

444 **REYNA:** That was my impression.

445 **MORGAN:** Okay.

446 **REYNA:** Yeah.

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447 **MORGAN:** That it was pretty much an immediate hang up?
448 **REYNA:** Yeah.
449 **MORGAN:** And how did that information affect your perspective on the call at that point?
450 **REYNA:** Well, we were going to keep trying phone contact. And if we couldn't, then we were going
451 to have to do that loud hail that I set up for and anticipated.
452 **MORGAN:** And did you, did the information about him hanging up on QUACKENBUSH, um, cause
453 you to reconsider at all the decision to consult or call out SERT/HNT?
454 **REYNA:** No. We weren't there yet.
455 **MORGAN:** And just explain to me a little more your thought process on that.
456 **REYNA:** Well, they're his children. Two of the children belong to him. Um, this is a guy who, you
457 know...we can't assume that he's wanting to harm them. I mean, personally, if I were upset, if I lost a
458 family member, the last person I'd want to talk to is the police. I absolutely would not want any police
459 contact. Because I didn't do anything. I'm upset. My family has died, and I don't need to talk to you.
460 Leave me alone. That would be my personal thing, and so, it's kind of like, well, you know, what's
461 going on here?
462 **MORGAN:** Just to try, and by all means correct me if I'm mischaracterizing it, but you felt that was
463 an understandable, not necessarily hostile reaction, to an event such as that?
464 **REYNA:** That's a good way of paraphrasing it, yeah.
465 **MORGAN:** Okay. And then you said at some point, very close in time, I think, to this, you get the
'66 information about him sending a text, don't make me go get my gun, I'm not playing, I'm serious. Do
467 you know how we got that information that he sent that text?
468 **REYNA:** Well, I know now that it was a text message. And I know that it was broadcast. And it had
469 to come from the girlfriend.
470 **MORGAN:** Okay. And how did you interpret that message?
471 **REYNA:** Leave me alone. Go away.
472 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did that information cause you to reconsider calling SERT or HNT?
473 **REYNA:** No. Because it's understandable. He doesn't want to talk to the police.
474 **MORGAN:** Okay. And what role did Sergeant BIRKINBINE fill once he arrived?
475 **REYNA:** Sergeant BIRKINBINE ended up helping QUACKENBUSH. Um, he is a hostage
476 negotiator and I know that he is on the hostage negotiating team. So, since he didn't need to do
477 anything there, he decided to help QUACKENBUSH with...and I assumed he was going to help
478 QUACKENBUSH formulate the wordage for what I wanted QUACKENBUSH to convey to Mr.
479 CAMPBELL. That's what I assumed he was going to be able to do.
480 **MORGAN:** Who was the incident commander once Sergeant BIRKINBINE arrived?
481 **REYNA:** I was.
482 **MORGAN:** Okay. And was anyone specifically assigned to relay information that Officer
483 QUACKENBUSH gained to the custody team members?
484 **REYNA:** Well, what I envisioned was that information coming to me so I could tell the custody team
485 and actually people on the air, because that's what I did later down the road when QUACKENBUSH
486 told me some texts that were coming through. I heard it from QUACK, so then I turned and I
'87 broadcast it.
488 **MORGAN:** Okay. So you kind of had that role yourself?
489 **REYNA:** Yes.
490 **MORGAN:** You feel like...okay.

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491 **REYNA:** Can we take a break?

492 **MORGAN:** Yeah.

493 **REYNA:** I want to refill my water.

494 **MORGAN:** Yeah, absolutely. Let's take a quick five minute break. It's about 1728, and we'll go off
495 for a minute here.

496

497 **MORGAN:** Okay, we are back after just a quick break here. It's about 1732 and we're continuing
498 with the interview of Sergeant REYNA. We were just talking about the kids coming out, basically, I
499 think. And, just tell me about how that transpired and where you were when that happened and all that
500 stuff.

501 **REYNA:** Okay, I was in the alcove, and BOYLAN was there, QUACKENBUSH was there, and
502 BIRKINBINE was there. And, and this is where I'm getting a little fuzzy on the...the, um, sequence of
503 events here. But at some point the children came out. And it must have been while I was having the
504 conversation with BOYLAN because then I heard the custody team say, we've got children, or some
505 indicator that there were children coming out. And I peeked out, and started seeing all the little
506 children come out. And so the officers went up and started collecting children, counted 1,2,3. I
507 thought, great...at first I thought, great, this is great, we've got the children. Um, and I said, take them,
508 take them out back towards where the dad's car was. He had a big SUV. And I remember specifically
509 having a scary thought because, you know, you've got this guy who wants suicide by cop, and my
510 initial gut reaction was, oh no, he's trying to get the children out of the way so he can escalate. And I
511 verbalized in the alcove, heads up, he may be escalating. That was an initial gut reaction. So, um, they
512 took the children to the SUV and I said get them out of here. Take them down the street, because I
513 didn't even want them at the entrance to the apartment because I felt that would be a safety issue.

514 **MORGAN:** Okay. All right. And did you know that QUACKENBUSH was going to be broaching
515 the subject of releasing the children to CAMPBELL?

516 **REYNA:** I did not. Um, I missed that whole part, and I was not advised by Sergeant BIRKINBINE
517 that that conversation had occurred.

518 **MORGAN:** Okay. So it was a surprise to you when the children appeared?

519 **REYNA:** Yes.

520 **MORGAN:** Okay. Okay, and then once the kids were out, you said you had an initial concern that he
521 might be escalating. Just kind of tell me big picture-wise what your thought of on what the call is
522 you're dealing with now and what your plan is going forward there.

523 **REYNA:** Well, I mean, things are going well in terms of what I had envisioned when I took this
524 incident. I had envisioned containment, isolation, communication and ultimately leaving, with or
525 without him. That's how this call was going to go. That was my mission plan from the get go. We
526 had the containment, we now had him isolated, and the question was, which way is it going to go from
527 here? Is he going to let us help him, or, again, is he going to come out with a gun and force us to shoot
528 him. And that's the worst case scenario. That's the scenario we did not want to happen. But, we
529 needed to try to have a conversation with him to see if we could get him some help. And so, I had a
530 huge sense of relief once the children were out because now I knew the woman was safe and the
531 children were safe, and all I was dealing with was him. And, if he wanted to come out and let us help
532 him, let us take him to the hospital, that would have been the ideal solution. If he told us to go pound
533 sand, didn't want to come out, then we were going to walk away. And I articulated that mission to the
534 people in the alcove, and I had conversations with the officers, we can't force him out. If he doesn't

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535 want to come out, we're going to leave. So, we're preparing for, hey do you want to come out. Then
536 we'll take him into custody. And then we're preparing to leave.

537 **MORGAN:** Okay. And just, timeframes are obviously difficult with something like this, but from the
538 time the kids came out to the time you articulating to the officers, hey, we might be packing it up, do
539 you...how long are we talking about here that this is going on?

540 **REYNA:** Um, I don't know how long that mindset had been put out there because I had put out that,
541 you know, we're going to try to get him to come out. If he didn't want to, we were going to leave.
542 And I can't remember if that was, you know, super close in time, but I do know that once those kids
543 came out, there was a, um, there was a problem in the alcove. ELIAS showed up, briefed him on the
544 situation, we were talking about, okay, if he comes out, you've got the dog. If he tries to run away,
545 you're going to get the dog on him. And then, me and LEWTON, me and LEWTON...was it
546 LEWTON? I don't know if LEWTON actually had come back in there. There was a conversation
547 about, what if he comes out and tries to run away or run back into the apartment. So, well, we can use
548 bean bags on him because you can use force on someone to prevent them from committing suicide. It's
549 in our policy. And my concern was him going and getting a gun and shooting himself. So, you know,
550 when it's a...well, if he tries to run, we'll bean bag him, we'll sic the dog on him. And I said to
551 ELIAS, are you okay with that? And ELIAS said, yeah, I'm good with that. Well, then BIRKINBINE
552 interjects and goes, well, are you sure you can do that? And, I got really irritated because I'm trying to
553 move forward now and get this thing done, and, um, ELIAS says, yeah, I can. I said, yeah, you can do
554 that. You can use force. And he goes...you know, he was questioning it, and he was questioning me.
555 I'm flipping my tape. It was like he was questioning me in front of the officers, and I had already
556 considered that. I was considering a lot of things, and my decision making out there was doing this
557 (*snapping fingers*). I mean, I'm firing off on all synapses. I brought my A-game to this table, and I
558 was constantly thinking about, what if this, what if that. I knew that I wanted to keep him from hurting
559 himself if he came out. And I didn't want to have to shoot him. I absolutely was doing everything in
560 my training and power to prevent an officer-involved shooting. And I felt that I had set everything up
561 to protect that and to prevent it. And I'm willing to use less lethal force on someone to avoid lethal
562 force. So JOHN interjects that question; ELIAS is like, well, I'm okay with it but then, it gets him
563 thinking, so then he gets on the phone and calls his sergeant. And says, sarge, can I use the dog as a
564 less lethal tool on this guy? And it was like, yeah. I could tell, he goes yeah, he's okay with it. Well,
565 duh, I already knew that. I didn't need someone questioning it. Especially not there. And then, they're
566 like, well, what if he doesn't come out? Well, then, we're going to leave. And BIRKINBINE is like,
567 well can we? Can we leave him in that apartment? And I'm like, yeah, why not? Well, it's not his
568 apartment. We can still leave him there. But it's her apartment. What if she doesn't want him there?
569 What if she doesn't have anywhere to go? And so, again, it slowed my forward movement down, and I
570 said, well, I'm perfectly fine leaving him there. Because of what we have, it's better to leave him there.
571 And I didn't have the time to fully articulate that reasoning. I mean, I could think of it in my head, all
572 the reasons why I could leave him there. But to satisfy BIRKINBINE, I told BOYLAN to call BURNS
573 and ask her if it's okay if he stays there, and does she have somewhere safe to go. And somehow,
574 whether I picked up the phone, or whether BOYLAN told me, it was made known to me, she's got
575 somewhere safe to go tonight. Okay, let's get this thing rolling. I wanted QUACKENBUSH to send a
576 message in to him and ask him if he's going to hurt himself. So, that's where we're going. And that
577 timeframe was about half an hour.

578 **MORGAN:** Okay.

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579 **REYNA:** So there was a huge lull because of these things that were going on, and it was...it was a
580 disagreement with Sergeant BIRKINBINE, and based on his questions, it was evident to me that he
581 wanted to stay and talk this guy out. And he didn't want to leave.

582 **MORGAN:** Okay. All right. Okay, um, you mentioned specifically in your detective interview, and
583 you kind of talked about it today, the quote in the detective interview is, "the training is, if they say, I
584 don't want to hurt myself, then we can walk away."

585 **REYNA:** Yes.

586 **MORGAN:** Can you just describe where you got that training, or if you remember...

587 **REYNA:** Yeah, I can tell you exactly where I got it. It's from real life experience as a patrol officer
588 back in the mid 90s. And Sergeant WOOTEN was the sergeant in charge of a suicidal female in her
589 house threatening to shoot herself. And I was assigned the less lethal on side three. JAN
590 ELLERTSON was my lethal cover, and I remember specifically, we were up in a tree house watching
591 in her window, I think it was her kitchen window, and we had containment, and I was the less lethal
592 operator, and they were trying to figure out how to get this woman out of the house. We had all
593 surrounded it. And it ended up being a 7-hour deal where they were talking to her, and somehow, I
594 don't know if WOOTEN did this or if his lieutenant did, but they brought a mental health worker,
595 someone from the mental health division was there, and I knew they were there on scene talking to him
596 to try to figure out how to talk this woman out or if they were going to talk to her or not. And the
597 reason this event stuck out so strongly in my head is because after sitting there for seven hours of
598 watching her walk around the house unarmed at that point, she finally goes to the drawer, opens the
599 drawer and pulls out a hand gun. And is now walking around the house with a hand gun. We're like,
600 okay, she's got the gun now. And she's just kind of, not pointing at herself, but she's with a gun. And
601 WOOTEN says, we're leaving. And JAN and I were just incredulous, like, why did we sit out here for
602 seven hours, and now this woman is leaving. So, he brings us all in for the debriefing, and he says that
603 the mental health people said, well, if you make them promise that they're not going to kill themselves,
604 then you have done all you can do. And evidently that's what happened. She promised she wasn't
605 going to kill herself. So...and you can't force yourself...and I already knew this from SERT, you don't
606 barge into someone's house just because they're feeling suicidal. There's no legal justification.
607 You're going to go in there to prevent them from killing themselves, what if they point the gun at you.
608 Then you've got to kill them. That doesn't make sense.

609 **MORGAN:** Okay. Um, did you ever...either enroute to the call or at any time during the call, did you
610 have any information that CAMPBELL had threatened anyone other than himself with harm?

611 **REYNA:** No.

612 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you ever get any information that he had committed a crime of any kind?

613 **REYNA:** No.

614 **MORGAN:** Okay. And do you feel like adjustments were made to the overall plan and goals of the
615 call based on the fact that he was suicidal rather than a criminal suspect?

616 **REYNA:** What do you mean by adjustments?

617 **MORGAN:** Um, let me ask it this way. Do you feel like the members of the custody team at the car,
618 do you feel like they understood that he was suicidal rather than a criminal suspect?

619 **REYNA:** Yes, I do.

620 **MORGAN:** Okay. And was there any discussion about altering commands that might be given to him
621 if he were to come outside? Um, or in any way altering the way the officers would interact with him
622 based on that fact?

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623 **REYNA:** I knew that if he had agreed to come out, that I was going to go back to the custody team
624 and I was going to orchestrate that team. And I knew that if he was resistant, I was going to be using
625 less lethal options to control him.
626 **MORGAN:** Okay.
627 **REYNA:** And I knew I needed to be flexible.
628 **MORGAN:** And, I know you said that, um, you had the discussion with ELIAS. Was either the
629 custody team or ELIAS...did you give them specific instructions to do "X" if CAMPBELL came out of
630 the apartment?
631 **REYNA:** No. I mean, custody teams know what they're doing. I knew these officers would know
632 what to do.
633 **MORGAN:** Okay.
634 **REYNA:** And, as I said, I envisioned myself being with them, and when I'm with a custody team, I
635 talk and I communicate with them about what I want and if I need to move people, I don't hesitate to,
636 you know, shift them around. And I felt that that's what my role was going to be.
637 **MORGAN:** Okay. And, you mentioned that if CAMPBELL came outside, you didn't want him to be
638 able to re-enter the apartment.
639 **REYNA:** Yes.
640 **MORGAN:** Can you just articulate a little more why you didn't want that?
641 **REYNA:** Well, my concern was, we needed to get this guy help, um, because he's threatening suicide,
642 he's emotional, um, I just really wanted to get him to a hospital. And they're just, people like that who
643 are so emotionally distraught are unpredictable. If he came out, my fear was that he would go back in
644 and get a gun. I just felt that was a big concern.
645 **MORGAN:** Okay.
646 **REYNA:** And then, what do you do with him...I mean, what do we do with this guy that night or the
647 next day? If you can get him to the hospital and get him help, hopefully, things will go well. What if
648 he stayed in there and then what would we do with the woman and the children? Do they go back to
649 that guy? You know, it's kind of like if you have the opportunity to get him, let's get him.
650 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you give the officers any specific force instructions on what to do to
651 prevent him from getting back into the apartment if he came out?
652 **REYNA:** Um, I can't remember if I did that. I mean, I envisioned using the dog to prevent him
653 because I know the dogs can take people down.
654 **MORGAN:** Do you remember having any conversations with LEWTON if he comes outside and
655 starts heading back to his apartment, I want you to deploy your less lethal? Any conversation like that?
656 **REYNA:** I think I did have a discussion of some sort we could do that as an option.
657 **MORGAN:** Okay.
658 **REYNA:** I don't think I ever said it was an order; I said, you know, like thinking of force options.
659 **MORGAN:** Do you remember when in this...when in the call that was? Was that early while you
660 were up there at the car, or was that later on?
661 **REYNA:** No, that was...I want to say it was the alcove, and that's why I'm telling you some of my
662 timing is getting off. But it seemed, to me it seemed like it was with ELIAS, but LEWTON was
663 supposed to be at the custody team. So, I don't know if he came, you know, people were walking
664 around. I don't know if he came to the alcove to get more information.
665 **MORGAN:** Okay.

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666 **REYNA:** But I just remember having a lot of discussions with the officers, because I wanted to
667 include them in on the plan.

668 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did your opinion about allowing him to be able to re-enter his apartment if he
669 left change at all once the children were out, or did you still feel like it was important not to let him
670 back in?

671 **REYNA:** I think the children were out at this time.

672 **MORGAN:** When you had that conversation?

673 **REYNA:** Yeah.

674 **MORGAN:** Okay, um, so now you've had the discussions and you've kind of told QUACKENBUSH,
675 get a hold of this guy and we're going to ask if he's okay. And if we can leave, basically.

676 **REYNA:** Yeah.

677 **MORGAN:** Now tell me what happens from here.

678 **REYNA:** Ask him...I tell him, ask him if he wants to hurt himself. And so then QUACKENBUSH
679 reports back to me, "never, wow you guys can text too, kudos to the police." And I'm like, wow, okay.
680 So, first of all I was like, well, what does never mean? Because I didn't know exactly what
681 QUACKENBUSH had sent to him, so my first question was, well, I don't really understand the
682 response. What do you mean by never. What do you interpret never. QUACKENBUSH said, I
683 interpret never to mean, I don't want to hurt myself. Okay, and I said, well, now he's also showing a
684 sense of humor. I go, he's acknowledging that we have the ability to text message. It seemed to me
685 like levity, like a light-hearted thing, and so when QUACKENBUSH gave me that information, I told,
686 on the air, I said, we're getting positive communication from him. And I also do remember reporting
687 over the air at some point that we were in contact with the male, but we had to use text communication,
688 so it's coming slowly. Be patient, hold your positions. Something to that effect. I remember it was
689 important for me to keep the entire unit, including the outer perimeter engaged, because I know people
690 get really bored, especially when they're on the corners and they start losing focus, and if you talk to
691 them, then they'll remember, oh, I got a mission here. I need to stay and pay attention. So, as soon as I
692 got that from QUACKENBUSH, I put it out over the air, talked to QUACKENBUSH about that
693 "never" statement, and I said, well, you need to button that down. Make him promise...I want you to
694 text him, promise me you're not going to hurt yourself. And I told people we're almost done, we're
695 almost done. He sends that, we're going to leave. My plan was to pull back the custody team first, get
696 the car out of the lot, clear the cars out of the front, and then pull the alcove team out. And then meet
697 later down the street and debrief the whole incident. That was my exit strategy, so to speak.

698 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you feel as the call was going along here that Officer QUACKENBUSH
699 was keeping you apprised of how the communication was going?

700 **REYNA:** Um, I guess I'm a little clouded on that because I've read the detective interviews and I've
701 read the Grand Jury testimony, and I can see there's a lot of information that I was not made aware of.

702 **MORGAN:** Okay.

703 **REYNA:** At the time I thought I was getting what was going on, but I now know that I didn't have.

704 **MORGAN:** And what specifically have you subsequently learned that you feel like would have
705 helped you on the call?

706 **REYNA:** Like the information from Sergeant BIRKINBINE's Grand Jury - I believe it was his Grand
707 Jury - testimony where he overheard the conversation that QUACKENBUSH was having about the
708 children, and the guy said...they were talking about, we're not here to arrest you, something about
709 we're here to make sure the children are safe, and he said something like, leave me alone or go away.
710 Something to that effect where...leave me alone, that's important for me to know. It's really

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711 important. Again, like I said, from my standpoint, I wouldn't want the police, so that kind of goes
712 along with my thinking. And then QUACKENBUSH is talking to him about, you're not under arrest.
713 We're here to make sure you're okay, and we can't leave until we know the children are safe. So,
714 we're not going to be able to leave until the children are safe. Well, that's what sent the children out. I
715 guess he didn't say it like, send them out, but it shows that, oh, okay, if I want the police to leave, then
716 I need to send the children out. That really helps my decision making, like, we should be leaving.
717 And, you know, if BIRKINBINE overheard that, he should have told me. I mean, really, he should
718 have communicated that with me.
719 **MORGAN:** Okay. And those pieces, was this probably while you were kind of at the, how big, how
720 big are these alcoves? I know it's...
721 **REYNA:** It's a little deeper than this room, and they were kind of in the shadow, and I was out at the
722 corner of the alcove talking with, um, BOYLAN, getting more information. And there was like a relay
723 to BURNS because he had the woman and all that stuff. And, yeah, he had the woman. And then I'm
724 monitoring the custody team, and just making sure the guy doesn't come out as I'm making sure
725 everybody's just in position.
726 **MORGAN:** Okay. I'm going to guess, is it 12 to 15 feet? Is that close?
727 **REYNA:** I don't want to say and be wrong.
728 **MORGAN:** Right. Out of hearing range of them anyway.
729 **REYNA:** Yes. Right.
730 **MORGAN:** Okay. And as far as you knew, were the custody team officers aware that the texting
731 back and forth with CAMPBELL appeared to be going well?
732 **REYNA:** When I told them that, they should have been aware of it.
733 **MORGAN:** And you kind of covered this, but just to be really clear, um, his initial text response, the
734 "never" statement to Officer QUACKENBUSH, explain to me why you felt that wasn't enough in and
735 of itself to walk away at that point.
736 **REYNA:** Because initially when I asked what that meant, it was kind of like, you know, well, I think
737 it means he doesn't want to hurt himself. It wasn't like, no, I don't want to hurt myself.
738 **MORGAN:** Okay. Just wanted to eliminate any ambiguity?
739 **REYNA:** I just wanted clarification, yeah.
740 **MORGAN:** Okay. And that's the instruction you gave QUACKENBUSH, get me a, get me a clear
741 statement...
742 **REYNA:** Promise, tell him to promise. Because that's what I knew from the 90s is what worked.
743 **MORGAN:** Okay.
744 **REYNA:** I mean, I had to look at it from a compassionate standpoint for this man's plight. I mean, we
745 had to make sure he's okay.
746 **MORGAN:** Okay. And, um, you tell QUACKENBUSH, get me, get me kind of...the final step here,
747 get me a promise. He, does he then return kind of deeper into the alcove to resume that, or...?
748 **REYNA:** Yeah, and now that I think about why I was distracted, why I didn't hear all of the
749 conversations, while I'm there, I was receiving a lot of phone calls. I got buzzed in by Sergeant
750 WHEELWRIGHT, and I remember picking up the phone. I was in the middle of something. Didn't
751 have time to answer, so I let it go to voicemail. When there was a lull, then I listened to the message.
752 It was an irrelevant message. Then at some point, Officer ELLERTSON called, Sergeant
753 ELLERTSON called me. So I took the phone call. Hey, do you need help? Do you need anything?
754 No, JAN, thanks I appreciate it. I got to go, I'm busy. Then the lieutenant called me. Hey, what have
755 you got? Hey, everything's under control. I'm working on it. We're good. You know. See you later.

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756 And I think he...and then he ended up calling twice. So, I was fielding phone calls while I was in that
757 alcove.

758 **MORGAN:** Okay.

759 **REYNA:** And that, and that explains to me why I didn't hear everything.

760 **MORGAN:** Okay. Right. And, just to kind of jump to that for a second, was that...when the
761 lieutenant called you, was that the first conversation you had with him about the call then?

762 **REYNA:** Um, yes.

763 **MORGAN:** Okay. And so, you tell QUACKENBUSH, get me a promise from him, and tell me what
764 happens from there.

765 **REYNA:** Well, at some point during the texting and the conversation, and this is another piece that I
766 keep forgetting to add, the radio is squawking, I'm being talked to on the radio, the lieutenant in the
767 middle of one of my phone calls with either BURNS, it must have been with BURNS, I need to get
768 some information from BURNS, I'm on the phone, the lieutenant's talking to me in my ear, hey, I need
769 to talk to you, and I said I'm on the phone, I'll call you back, or something like that. So then I have to
770 take the phone call. Then I call RODRIGUES and it seemed like there were other, there were other
771 people chirping in my ear, trying to get my attention.

772 **MORGAN:** Okay. And were you present when QUACKENBUSH sent the text saying, can you
773 promise me you're not going to hurt yourself?

774 **REYNA:** I think I was.

775 **MORGAN:** Okay.

776 **REYNA:** Because at this point, is where the lieutenant and the captain are showing up. Captain Bob
777 DAY, Lieutenant DEREK RODRIGUES. And the initial call from RODRIGUES was, you know,
778 what's going on, and I'm trying to give him a quick, hey, we're almost done here, and I'll tell you
779 about it. And I've worked with DEREK enough that he trusts that I'll be able to brief him when there's
780 a really good lull in the action, and he gives me the ability to do my job, finish the task, and then say,
781 okay, here's what I've got, this is what I'm doing. And it seems like there was a sense of urgency on
782 his part at this point in time, with it buttoning down, that ...the text message to make him promise,
783 because I'm trying to get out of there. I'm...my plan is to pull that team out, I want to button this down
784 so I can get us out, but now we've got command staff showing up. And they want to know what's
785 happening now. Right now. This instant. And there was a point in time when Captain DAY arrived
786 and he was trying to find me, and I'm trying to explain I'm in an alcove. And then he's calling for
787 people because, I guess there was a crowd control situation out front. And I didn't have time to deal
788 with that. He's there, he can deal with it. I'm busy in the alcove. So then, as I tell QUACKENBUSH,
789 make him promise he's not going to hurt himself, then I get ordered to leave my position and go brief
790 Captain DAY. And I remember just thinking, I can't believe this is happening because I, you know, he
791 wants me to come to him. I looked at BIRKINBINE, BIRKINBINE says, you better get going. All
792 right. You got it. So, that's when I left.

793 **MORGAN:** Okay. How was it conveyed to you that you were ordered back? Was that...well, first of
794 all, what was the method, was it radio or...?

795 **REYNA:** I'm sure it was on the radio.

796 **MORGAN:** Okay.

797 **REYNA:** Because BIRKINBINE knew it. He wouldn't have known that if it wasn't on the radio.

798 **MORGAN:** Okay.

799 **REYNA:** And it was very clear to me what...I can't remember the specific verbiage, but to me it was
800 a very clear order.

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801 **MORGAN:** Okay.

802 **REYNA:** Come back to me.

803 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you consider telling him, I can't right this minute? I'll be with you when

804 I can. Is that a thought that...

805 **REYNA:** I thought there was a lull in the action, because I was just waiting for that text, the response

806 from the text. And I felt that even if I was talking to the Captain, if he says, yeah, I promise I'm not

807 going to hurt myself, they could just tell me on the radio. And then I could order the team back.

808 **MORGAN:** Okay, okay. And who was in charge of the call while you were briefing Captain DAY?

809 **REYNA:** Well, it would have to be Sergeant BIRKINBINE. Because...well, he's in charge of the

810 custody team and he's in charge of QUACKENBUSH. As soon as I leave that alcove, that's his

811 responsibility.

812 **MORGAN:** And was that a discussion you guys had, or is that something you...?

813 **REYNA:** It was intuitive.

814 **MORGAN:** Okay. Okay, and then, I think it's in your after-action, you made reference that while you

815 were beginning to brief Captain DAY, you received a call from Officer BURNS?

816 **REYNA:** Yes.

817 **MORGAN:** And he gives you some information? Can you tell me about that?

818 **REYNA:** Yes. And this is, you know, one of those things I told you, I was getting more information.

819 Um, he talked to the female, and somehow she starts to tell us that last night he had pointed the gun to

820 his head, pulled the trigger four times, but the gun didn't go off, so instead, he held it up in the air,

821 pulled the trigger, and it went off. And that doesn't really make a lot of sense to me, but, you know,

822 that's what...now she's telling me that happened. So I considered that information, and even knowing

823 that I thought to myself, I'm still comfortable leaving him in there and not forcing a police

824 confrontation with a guy who wants suicide by police. We don't want that. Let's leave. And so after I

825 finished that phone call, then that's when I briefed Captain DAY that everything I had, including that

826 new information, I said, despite this...what I just heard, it would have been nice if I knew it an hour

827 ago, I still think we should leave.

828 **MORGAN:** Okay.

829 **REYNA:** I'm comfortable in walking away.

830 **MORGAN:** And so that was the first time you got that information, that he'd actually fired a shot, was

831 at the very end there?

832 **REYNA:** Yes.

833 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you have any impression on had Officer BURNS just learned that

834 information?

835 **REYNA:** That was my impression.

836 **MORGAN:** Okay.

837 **REYNA:** I think it was because we were trying to determine his mental state, you know, if he was

838 okay to leave, or was he going to kill himself as soon as we left.

839 **MORGAN:** Okay. And so you began briefing the Captain. The lieutenant is there also?

840 **REYNA:** Yes.

841 **MORGAN:** Um, prior to Mr. CAMPBELL coming outside, um, had Captain DAY officially assumed

842 command of the call?

843 **REYNA:** Well, what do you mean by officially?

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844 **MORGAN:** Was it your impression that he was the incident commander at the time Mr. CAMPBELL
845 came outside?

846 **REYNA:** Yes.

847 **MORGAN:** Okay.

848 **REYNA:** Even though he didn't verbalize it, it was my impression the moment he ordered me back
849 that he was taking incident command.

850 **MORGAN:** Okay. Had you finished briefing him at the time Mr. CAMPBELL came out? It's kind
851 of hard to get the timeframe sense from the reports.

852 **REYNA:** Yes. I can, because what happened is I told him what I knew, here's what I had. Lieutenant
853 RODRIGUES said, I think we should stay. And then Captain DAY stood there and just kind of had a
854 thoughtful look on his face like he's thinking about it. I mean, literally, there was like, we said what
855 we said, and then he stopped and he was just thinking. And he didn't say anything.

856 **MORGAN:** Okay. And so it was your impression he had the...or, I shouldn't say it's your
857 impression. You had given him all the information prior to Mr. CAMPBELL coming outside?

858 **REYNA:** Yes.

859 **MORGAN:** Okay. Um, how long of a timeframe are we talking about here, would you say? From the
860 time you finished, this is everything I've got on the call so far, to the time you hear that CAMPBELL
861 was coming outside.

862 **REYNA:** I can't tell you that timeframe. I can only tell you that from reading the CAD printout, the
863 time I left the alcove to when CAMPBELL came out was about nine minutes.

864 **MORGAN:** Okay.

865 **REYNA:** So that's me leaving, taking the phone call, briefing, and then he comes out.

866 **MORGAN:** Okay. All right. Let me put it this way. Do you feel from the time the briefing
867 concluded to the time CAMPBELL came out, was there enough of an interval there that if Captain
868 DAY had decided to pull everyone back, would you guys have been...would there have been enough
869 time to get everyone, to reverse the patrol car out of the parking lot and get everyone around the corner,
870 or was it...?

871 **REYNA:** Before CAMPBELL came out?

872 **MORGAN:** Yeah. Obviously leaving aside the fact that we asked him to come out, but...

873 **REYNA:** If we hadn't asked him to come out and Captain DAY said, let's pull back? Yeah, I think
874 we would have had time.

875 **MORGAN:** Yeah, okay.

876 **REYNA:** And I say we, I mean BIRKINBINE. I didn't ask him to come out.

877 **MORGAN:** Okay. And let's go to that portion of the call here. Did you have any understanding
878 when you left the alcove that QUACKENBUSH was going to be asking CAMPBELL to come outside?

879 **REYNA:** Absolutely not. That was not the mission.

880 **MORGAN:** Okay. And you were not present when that conversation occurred?

881 **REYNA:** No.

882 **MORGAN:** Do you know if the information that we were going to be asking him to come outside was
883 conveyed to the other officers at the scene?

884 **REYNA:** No, because I didn't hear it. But I don't know if it was conveyed through the alcove. I can't
885 speak for that part. I can just tell you I don't remember hearing it over the air.

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886 **MORGAN:** Okay. And I think I know the answer to this, but just to be...just to ask it, um, from the
887 time QUACKENBUSH asked CAMPBELL to come outside to the time he actually came outside, do
888 you have any idea...?
889 **REYNA:** No idea.
890 **MORGAN:** Okay. And were you actually a witness to any of the activity once Mr. CAMPBELL
891 came out of the apartment?
892 **REYNA:** No.
893 **MORGAN:** Okay. Did you hear any of the commands being given?
894 **REYNA:** No, I just heard yelling.
895 **MORGAN:** Okay. Indecipherable?
896 **REYNA:** Yes.
897 **MORGAN:** Was it, was it your impression that it was the police you were hearing?
898 **REYNA:** Yes.
899 **MORGAN:** Giving commands?
900 **REYNA:** Yes.
901 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you hear Mr. CAMPBELL yelling anything at the officers?
902 **REYNA:** No.
903 **MORGAN:** From the time that you start hearing yelling, um, the commands being given, is there a
904 gap, time gap, between the yelling stopping and you hearing the bean bag being deployed?
05 **REYNA:** Um, I don't know.
906 **MORGAN:** And did you hear any yelling or any commands after the first less lethal shot?
907 **REYNA:** I don't remember. I heard people, but I don't remember.
908 **MORGAN:** Okay. And what happens after Mr. CAMPBELL is shot? What are you doing at that
909 point?
910 **REYNA:** I'm devastated. I heard the lethal round.
911 **MORGAN:** Okay. Why don't we take a quick break? It is about 1808. And we'll go off tape again
912 for a minute here.
913
914 **MORGAN:** Okay, and we are back on tape here. It is 1816. Continuing with the interview of
915 Sergeant REYNA. And we're kind of at the end of the sequence of events here on the call here, um, I
916 was just asking where you were physically when you heard the fatal shot go out?
917 **REYNA:** You asked me what happened, and I said that I was devastated when I heard it, and you
918 asked me what the next sequence of events was. And that was me hearing Sergeant BIRKINBINE call
919 on the air for medical stage, and I was still with Captain DAY and Lieutenant RODRIGUES, and I
920 peeked around the corner and looked at JOHN and the custody team to see what they were doing, and
921 JOHN was trying to get DAY's attention. He wanted to call him, and DAY didn't want to be called at
922 that point in time. And I looked at JOHN's face, and it was this look of anguish, like what am I
923 supposed to do? I mean, I could tell he needed to talk to the Captain. And, um, Captain DAY started
924 doing something, I can't remember what, but at some point BIRKINBINE did make that phone call,
925 and I could hear them talking about whether or not patrol was going to be able to take custody of Mr.
~26 CAMPBELL. And the information I gathered was no, JOHN didn't want to do that. So then Captain
~27 DAY, um, either at that point or right before had formally come on the air and taken incident command
928 over the air and activated SERT. And I was told to shut down Sandy, so I had broadcast over the air to
929 shut down Sandy.

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930 **MORGAN:** Okay. And you were, I guess, around the corner from the apartment building, kind of to
931 the northwest of where this all happened?
932 **REYNA:** Yes.
933 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you overhear enough to know why patrol wasn't going to be doing the
934 custody?
935 **REYNA:** My assumption was they couldn't see his hands.
936 **MORGAN:** Okay.
937 **REYNA:** And that's what we're trained not to do, is approach if you can't see the hands. That was
938 my assumption.
939 **MORGAN:** Okay. You didn't specifically hear that necessarily, though?
940 **REYNA:** No.
941 **MORGAN:** Okay. And did you hear any of the officers doing, um, loud hailing towards Mr.
942 CAMPBELL, um, giving him any commands after the shot was fired at all?
943 **REYNA:** I may have. I may have had a brief recall of something, but not specifically what was said.
944 **MORGAN:** Okay. And was it your impression, was it Captain DAY's decision ultimately to activate
945 SERT, would you say?
946 **REYNA:** Yes.
947 **MORGAN:** Is that a fair way of characterizing it?
948 **REYNA:** Um, well, I think it was him and BIRKINBINE.
49 **MORGAN:** Okay.
950 **REYNA:** BIRKINBINE wanted SERT.
951 **MORGAN:** Okay.
952 **REYNA:** And the Captain agreed. I mean, he agreed.
953 **MORGAN:** And, again, I think I know the answer to this, but just to be clear for the tape and for the
954 interview, did you hear any discussion about, amongst the officers, about an approach and how to
955 tactically do an approach?
956 **REYNA:** No.
957 **MORGAN:** Okay. And do you know what Lieutenant RODRIGUES was doing while the decision
958 was being made over whether to activate SERT?
959 **REYNA:** He was isolating FRASHOUR and his partner because FRASHOUR got dialed out of it. So
960 he was making arrangements to separate them and get them in a car, and get people assigned to them.
961 **MORGAN:** Okay. And do you know specifically what Captain DAY was doing, um, in the interim
962 between the time the shot was fired and the time that SERT was activated? I know part of that was
963 obviously taken up by the conversation with BIRKINBINE over the situation, but you said when
964 BIRKINBINE was initially looking like he wanted to call him, that that wasn't happening. Do you
965 know what DAY was doing in that time period?
966 **REYNA:** I think he was trying to shut down streets and contain the scene further.
967 **MORGAN:** Okay. And do you know who handled the notifications per the directive? Obviously
968 some of the folks were already there, but as far as who notified homicide detectives and those,
969 identification division, and those sort of things?
70 **REYNA:** I do not.
971 **MORGAN:** Okay. Did you do any of those notifications personally?
972 **REYNA:** No.
973 **MORGAN:** Okay. And who was in charge of the incident, the scene, after the shooting?

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974 **REYNA:** Captain DAY.
975 **MORGAN:** Okay. And is it your impression he pretty much ran the scene the remainder of the time
976 you were there?
977 **REYNA:** Yes.
978 **MORGAN:** Okay. Did you ever sign a crime scene log?
979 **REYNA:** I don't think I did. Someone did.
980 **MORGAN:** Okay. You don't remember who did that, then?
981 **REYNA:** No.
982 **MORGAN:** Okay. Did you see, or I guess hear, Officer FRASHOUR talking with anyone following
983 the shooting? That night?
984 **REYNA:** No.
985 **MORGAN:** Okay. And do you know why you were not called to testify at the Grand Jury?
986 **REYNA:** Absolutely not. Do you?
987 **MORGAN:** I don't. Okay. Bear with me just a minute. I just want to make sure we obviously don't
988 leave anything out or have to call you back in here if we miss any questions. Just a couple of little
989 quick things and then I'll turn it over to BARRY. Um, you discussed your...when you initially
990 received the call, um, before you were able to assess the scene and all that, why you felt calling SERT
991 and HNT would have been premature at that point. Um, as the call developed, as Ms. JONES came
992 outside and talked to you guys, did that change your threat assessment of the call? Did that make
993 it...did you feel like it was more likely to be a SERT callout or less, or did it change it at all?
994 **REYNA:** No, because we were getting what we wanted. We were getting the results we want. She
995 was coming out.
996 **MORGAN:** Okay. And, again, same thing, when the children come out...?
997 **REYNA:** Don't need SERT. We're getting what we wanted.
998 **MORGAN:** Okay.
999 **REYNA:** We're handling it.
1000 **MORGAN:** And as best you can, if you can just kind of articulate, um, what did you feel in your mind
1001 would have been the pros and the cons of calling SERT/HNT out on this call? And I realize obviously
1002 the circumstances changed over the course of the call so this is a difficult question to answer in one fell
1003 swoop, but as best you can, what were the pros and the cons of making that call?
1004 **REYNA:** Like, from the initial call coming out, like, boom, hit SERT right now the minute it comes
1005 out? Wow, that's really, really premature. I mean, if we did that on every one of these calls, we'd need
1006 probably five fulltime SERT teams to do that. Um, you would probably have the same or worse result.
1007 But the pro meaning, you'd have a bunch more people on your perimeter. You'd have a sniper on
1008 every corner. So if you were going to dispatch the guy, if that's what you wanted, you've got a sniper
1009 on every corner. Um, you would have an HNT element, I mean, that's an hour out for a SERT callout.
1010 That's an hour. Um, you're asking a big hypothetical that requires a lot of speculation, and I'm not
1011 sure I can entirely speculate on it. But just from the manpower standpoint, you'd have a bunch of
1012 bodies. The con side is, having been on SERT callouts as a SERT operator, is that you have even more
1013 weapons, even more, I don't want to use the word rigid, but tactical...you know, I'm imagining
1014 CAMPBELL coming out not complying as happened in this case here. I could see the same result in
1015 getting shot. I can just see that. But it would be from a .308 rather than a .223 perhaps.
1016 **MORGAN:** Okay.

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1017 **REYNA:** But SERT doesn't go in on these also. I know that SERT would have left because I've had
1018 conversations with critical incident commanders, and when you have a guy by himself, alone, who
1019 doesn't want to come out, and even if they talked to HNT and he tells them pound sand, SERT would
1020 leave.

1021 **MORGAN:** When ELIAS arrived first at the alcove, do you remember did he bring up the topic of
1022 calling SERT? Do you remember having that conversation with him at all?

1023 **REYNA:** No.

1024 **MORGAN:** Okay. Okay, I think that's all I've got for now. BARRY?

1025 **REYNA:** I've just got a couple questions. This is BARRY RENNA. Not so much, Sergeant
1026 MORGAN just asked you this question, but I think he phrased it in terms of SERT activation and you
1027 thinking about it, but early on in the interview today, we were, Sergeant MORGAN asked you about,
1028 make an assessment of the situation based on the information you had, and it appeared that you were
1029 making reference to the info that was on the CAD printout. Um, when you were getting that info, you
1030 presumably had maybe a preconceived assessment of the situation. Did it change after you got there
1031 and Ms. JONES came out, and she started conveying, you know, the information that she had? Did
1032 things elevate for you? Did they go down? What was...did your assessment of it change from your
1033 initial assessment?

1034 **REYNA:** Well, the fact that she came out was good, and it did tell me that he had not harmed her. So,
1035 that part lowered. But when she said that our presence would escalate him, that concerned me. And
36 that didn't lower it. Because now my concern is about the children, and what's he going to do with the
1037 children.

1038 **REYNA:** Okay. And then when the kids came out, did your...did you reassess, and did you escalate
1039 or did you de-escalate?

1040 **REYNA:** I de-escalated, I felt things were going really well.

1041 **REYNA:** Okay. What was your assessment of the custody team? Were they...what was their...what
1042 was your assessment of them when these things were occurring, when Ms. JONES came out, and then
1043 the kids came out? How were they reacting to those things, those changes?

1044 **REYNA:** Um, I don't know. I mean, I wasn't in their head. I didn't ask them.

1045 **REYNA:** Could you see anything, any physical signs, could you hear things that they were talking
1046 about, did you...were you able to gauge from the tones of their voice anything at all, any indicators at
1047 all to you, on whether they were escalating, de-escalating or staying the same?

1048 **REYNA:** They appeared to be level. Just level.

1049 **REYNA:** Okay. Ms. JONES at one point communicated that Mr. CAMPBELL was suicidal the
1050 previous night. That's when he supposedly allegedly held a gun to his head, did the misfire four times
1051 and then fired one up into the air. But in that same conversation, apparently also said that he was fine
1052 today. Um, did that change your assessment of what was occurring then?

1053 **REYNA:** Well, that's what he asked me about. Did you know about him being fine today, and all I
1054 knew was he was calm right now. So, you're asking me something that he asked that I said that I
1055 didn't hear that portion of it.

1056 **REYNA:** Okay. You said at one point that you were assuming that Sergeant BIRKINBINE was trying
1057 to convey information to Officer QUACKENBUSH when Officer QUACKENBUSH was
1058 communicating with Mr. CAMPBELL. Do you remember what you were assuming, what it was...like
1059 Sergeant BIRKINBINE, the way you portrayed it, was the conduit of...

1060 **REYNA:** Not the way you just asked it. What you just said doesn't make any sense of what I said.

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1061 **RENNA:** Were you trying to get information to Officer QUACKENBUSH through Sergeant
1062 BIRKINBINE?
1063 **REYNA:** No. If I needed something from QUACKENBUSH, I told him directly.
1064 **RENNA:** Okay. And you said that having Mr. CAMPBELL come out of the apartment was not part
1065 of the plan, it was not a goal?
1066 **REYNA:** Not at the end game. Not after, um, we were already...after he had not come out before. He
1067 sent the children out, but he didn't come out. So once he isolated himself, then that wasn't my plan. It
1068 wasn't my plan to force him out.
1069 **RENNA:** Okay. Was there any disagreement about that strategy?
1070 **REYNA:** Yes. I think I articulated that, and that's when BIRKINBINE and I had the discussion in the
1071 alcove in front of the officers. If he says he's not going to hurt himself, we leave, and it was my
1072 impression BIRKINBINE wanted to stay and talk him out.
1073 **RENNA:** That's it.
1074 **MORGAN:** DAVE.
1075 **DOBLER:** Sergeant REYNA, since you've had a chance to review a bunch of documents here and
1076 give this a lot of thought since the incident date, regarding BOEC radio's performance in this. Is there
1077 any other information that you found out that would have been helpful to your decision and tactical
1078 process at the scene, but you didn't have that information at the time?
1079 **REYNA:** Um, having access to...there were several callers, I learned later on, that called in regarding
1080 this event, and there was some information, I believe, BOEC had the information about the gun
1081 incident and did not relay that to us.
1082 **RENNA:** Just for clarification, are you talking about the incident the previous evening?
1083 **REYNA:** Um, no. When they called in on this, his aunt...his aunt or her aunt, and her dad both called
1084 in on this.
1085 **RENNA:** Okay.
1086 **REYNA:** And the police bureau put some dispatch tapes and stuff on the Internet, or something like
1087 that.
1088 **MORGAN:** And, just to be clear, what we're talking about here I think is that the 911 caller on this
1089 call, this welfare check call, gave the information that Mr. CAMPBELL had fired a shot the night
1090 before and had held the gun to his head, and that wasn't put into the CAD.
1091 **REYNA:** Right.
1092 **MORGAN:** And that's what we're talking about. Okay. There is just some confusion about last
1093 night, this night. I just want to be clear. Okay. Go ahead DAVE.
1094 **DOBLER:** How would that have changed, you believe, things that you would have done or suggested
1095 that the other officers, either the contact officers...
1096 **REYNA:** I want to get my tape, because I want to get this. Your question was how would that have
1097 changed the tactics? Well, I would have had more officers there sooner. We would have been able to
1098 get things set up much more quickly, which I think would have moved things along faster. As I said
1099 previously, this was at the eastern, eastern most end of the precinct. I had to come from North Precinct,
1100 and that was time intensive. Especially during rush hour traffic, that time of day. And a lot of the set
1101 up was time dependent. It took time to get the resources there and we weren't able to get the ball
1102 rolling. So we would have been able to do that a lot quicker.
1103 **DOBLER:** Okay. You had mentioned before, and I think it's clear just from your articulation and
1104 your confidence here that you're probably, I would say, above average. I've been in law enforcement

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1105 for 27 years, in your skills and tactics. Can you go into some of the specialized training that you've
1106 been given and specialized skills and training that you have sought out for yourself.

1107 **REYNA:** Yes. As I previously mentioned, I have...I've got the certifications in the AR; certification
1108 in less lethal; I've attended firearms training which requires a lot of decision making; I do tactical
1109 shooting competitions which requires a lot of quick decision making; I've been afforded the
1110 opportunity to go to leadership training, and I've been to two leadership seminars; I've been to the
1111 SERT basic SWAT school, so I've learned a lot of tactics from there, plus a lot of tactics from my
1112 tenure on SERT in having been deployed on callouts; I've had conversations with JAMES FERRARIS
1113 specifically to discuss critical incident management because I seek the knowledge and the skill sets to
1114 be able to perform my job here; I've also attended training through the Federal Government in weapons
1115 of mass destruction; I've been to the Center for Domestic Preparedness; and all that kind of training
1116 helps me focus on these missions of protecting life and thinking in big pictures and moving lots of
1117 resources in a big picture fashion. I think that has been a benefit to me, to the shift, and to the Portland
1118 Police Bureau. And I'm very fortunate and grateful to have that training, and I know that on this day,
1119 they had one of their best sergeants on this call.

1120 **DOBLER:** Sergeant REYNA, you had testified earlier that when you were in the alcove and the kids
1121 came out, you had a scary thought. At first you were relieved and then thought, and I'm paraphrasing,
1122 that maybe this means something else. And you said, heads up, he may be escalating. Was that to the
1123 custody crew via just voice, or was that over the radio?

1124 **REYNA:** It was voice.

1125 **DOBLER:** Okay. Was it your impression that the custody team actually heard and acknowledged
1126 what you were saying?

1127 **REYNA:** I don't know if they heard it. I know that the people in the alcove next to me may have
1128 heard it.

1129 **DOBLER:** Okay. Um, let's see, you talked several times about wanting to walk away from the
1130 incident once you basically established that everyone is okay. The girlfriend was out, the three children
1131 were out, and can you just tell me a little bit more about that? In your mind, were you 100% or pretty
1132 close to 100% that the custody team that you had, you had canine, you had a bean bag less lethal, and
1133 hands-on people, that they understood that?

1134 **REYNA:** That...?

1135 **DOBLER:** That it was your desire to look for the opportunity to disengage?

1136 **REYNA:** I think a lot of people knew that. I don't know specifically the custody team knew that, but I
1137 also remember the flip side of him sending the children out is after he sent the text, never, kudos to the
1138 police, I remember saying, and I think I looked at JOHN BIRKINBINE and said, well, that looks like a
1139 sign of good faith now that he sent the children out. That was a good thing. It's okay. Look, I don't
1140 want to hurt the children. So, after getting that text, I heard that, it's like, this is good. This is a good
1141 sign. He doesn't want to hurt them. So that went into my decision making. I forgot to say that.

1142 **DOBLER:** And lastly, do you have a few notes that might be helpful for any debriefing or training
1143 considerations for this incident?

1144 **REYNA:** I do. We never got a chance to tactically debrief this. And I think there's ways that we can
1145 improve in the future.

1146 **DOBLER:** Can we give you that copy?

1147 **MORGAN:** Yeah, is this a copy for us to keep?

1148 **DOBLER:** Yes.

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1149 **MORGAN:** Okay. Very good. And do you want to discuss these on tape, or is this pretty self-
1150 explanatory?
1151 **REYNA:** It's self-explanatory.
1152 **MORGAN:** Okay. Very good. Is that it? Okay. There's just a couple kind of wrap-up questions
1153 here, and then I think we'll be all set. Um, have you talked with anyone else about this case, or read or
1154 heard any of the news accounts of this incident that has influenced your perception about what you saw
1155 or observed?
1156 **REYNA:** No.
1157 **MORGAN:** Okay. Did you participate in the EAP debrief?
1158 **REYNA:** Yes.
1159 **MORGAN:** And anything you learned there that you feel has contaminated your independent
1160 recollection of the events?
1161 **REYNA:** No.
1162 **MORGAN:** Okay. Do you have any information that you believe would be relevant to this case
1163 which we haven't covered here today?
1164 **REYNA:** No.
1165 **MORGAN:** Anything at all related to the call that we haven't gone over?
1166 **REYNA:** No, not that I can think of at this time.
1167 **MORGAN:** Okay. And anybody that you believe we should talk to about the incident that we might
68 not already be aware of?
1169 **REYNA:** No.
1170 **MORGAN:** Okay. And, I think this is going to tie into this, keeping in mind that this is an
1171 administrative review, is there anything about this incident that caused you concern or you want to
1172 address in an effort to improve future performance?
1173 **REYNA:** Yes. And that's it.
1174 **MORGAN:** Safe to say that's addressed? Okay. All right. Very good. So I'll make a copy of that
1175 and add it to the case file then. And...
1176 **DOBLER:** I would just reiterate the BOEC information, getting all the information to everybody,
1177 including, especially the tactical sergeant that's running the mission. I mean, that may have had
1178 something very major to do with this incident.
1179 **MORGAN:** Okay. Anything else?
1180 **REYNA:** No.
1181 **MORGAN:** Okay. We'll go ahead and conclude the interview then. It is 1642.
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1184 10b0004trs-reyna
1185 Transcribed 04/07/2010 / 11:00 p.m. Gayle Laird (0403gl01)

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